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Abstract—The power consumption of households has been
constantly growing over the years. To cope with this growth, intel-
ligent management of the consumption profile of the households
is necessary, such that the households can save the electricity
bills, and the stress to the power grid during peak hours can be
reduced. However, implementing such a method is challenging
due to the existence of randomness in the electricity price and
the consumption of the appliances. To address this challenge, we
employ a model-free method for the households which works with
limited information about the uncertain factors. More specifically,
the interactions between households and the power grid can
be modeled as a non-cooperative stochastic game, where the
electricity price is viewed as a stochastic variable. To search for
the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game, we adopt a method based
on distributed deep reinforcement learning. Also, the proposed
method can preserve the privacy of the households. We then
utilize real-world data from Pecan Street Inc., which contains
the power consumption profile of more than 1, 000 households,
to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. In average,
the results reveal that we can achieve around 12% reduction on
peak-to-average ratio (PAR) and 11% reduction on load variance.
With this approach, the operation cost of the power grid and the
electricity cost of the households can be reduced.
Index Terms—Deep reinforcement learning, stochastic game,
real-time pricing, smart grid, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH a growing population, an increasing standard ofliving, and more power-demanding appliances being
used in households, the energy consumption in residential
households has increased considerably in the recent years, and
is anticipated to grow even further [1]. Improvements in energy
efficiency have not been significant enough to counteract the
increasing demand [2]. To overcome this situation, the deploy-
ment of intelligent devices and communication infrastructure
in smart grids becomes an important initiative. By doing so,
the demand side is able to play an active role in energy
management to balance demand and supply. More specifically,
the demand side can change the consumption profile based on
information (such as electricity price and generation capacity)
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from the supply side. For example, the authors in [3] proposed
several concepts for scheduling the consumption of household
appliances to reduce the electricity cost.
Subsequently, many research papers [4]–[11] have sug-
gested several mechanisms to schedule the consumption of
the appliances. The authors in [4], [5] applied game theory to
model the interaction between the utility companies and the
customers to reduce the power consumption. A real-time pric-
ing scheme was adopted in [6], and a genetic algorithm was
utilized to minimize the electricity cost. Instead of schedul-
ing the appliances in the residential area, the scheduling of
industrial loads was considered in [7]. Then, an incentive
scheme was applied in [8] to encourage more households to
participate in load scheduling. When scheduling appliances,
privacy-sensitive information of households may be revealed to
the utility companies. In this regard, the solutions proposed in
[4]–[8] may be of limited applicability. Therefore, the authors
in [9] proposed an algorithm adopting a randomized approach
to address the privacy issue while scheduling household ap-
pliances. On the other hand, the power system will include
even more renewable energy resources in the future. Therefore,
it is important to incorporate the uncertainty associated with
renewable energy resources for scheduling the consumption
of appliances as stated in [10]. The authors in [11] further
considered the quality of experience (QoE) when scheduling
the load with renewable energy.
However, with more and more households connected to the
power grid, the computational complexity of the centralized
algorithms has become a significant issue. Therefore, several
works have proposed distributed algorithms for scheduling
the appliances [12]–[16]. In [12], the distributed algorithm
required the coordination between households. The authors in
[13] proposed a scheme where the households can have access
to the energy market, and the independent system operator
(ISO) can send the incentive signal to the households such
that the generation cost can be minimized. The authors in
[14] introduced a primal-dual method to design a distributed
algorithm, so that the necessary amount of communication
between households can be reduced. In [15], a distributed
algorithm was designed based on the architecture in [13] where
households can directly participate in the energy market. The
distributed algorithm jointly scheduled the charging behavior
of electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce the procurement cost
from the energy market. Then, distributed load scheduling was
applied in commercial ports in [16].
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2In the above works, the scheduling problem is mainly solved
with model-based control approaches. These approaches pro-
vided good results for scheduling the consumption of the ap-
pliances. However, detailed information on the system model
is required as input to the model-based control approaches.
For example, the transition probability of the electricity price
should be modeled; however, electricity price is generated real-
time, and therefore it cannot be obtained in advance. Obtaining
such an accurate model and maintaining its accuracy are non-
trivial tasks. In this context, model-free control approaches
are considered as valuable alternatives to model-based control
solutions. An advantage of model-free methods is that they can
obtain similar performance as model-based methods without
relying on the knowledge of the system. The most popular
model-free control paradigm is reinforcement learning (RL).
RL has also been deployed in several works in the energy
domain. For instance, the authors in [17] applied both a model-
based method and RL to control the power oscillation damp-
ing. The results reveal that RL can be more robust compared
to the model-based method. Then, the problem of scheduling
the consumption of the appliances can be formulated with
a Markov decision process (MDP) and solved by applying
traditional RL techniques (e.g., in [18] and [19], the authors
deployed Q-learning). The authors in [20] focused on using Q-
learning to schedule the power consumption of water heaters.
A similar framework was discussed in [21], where the authors
adopted distributed Q-learning to learn the scheduling policy.
The authors in [22] focused on scheduling the load profile
of thermostatically controlled loads (e.g., water heaters or
heat pumps). Load scheduling with RL was incorporated with
privacy-preserving mechanism in [23]. However, Q-learning
needs to discretize the state and the action spaces to build the
Q-table; the performance relies heavily on the resolution of
the discretization. Also, higher resolution of the discretization
increases the computation time.
Recently, compared with the model-based methods, model-
free methods have obtained remarkable breakthroughs. The
researchers from OpenAI found out that deep neural network
(DNN) can be a good approximator to generate the Q-table;
thus, the discretization of the state space in the traditional RL
techniques is not necessary. This framework is called Deep
Q-Network (DQN) [24], and it has been applied in [25],
[26]. The consumption of the appliances in a building was
scheduled by DQN in [25]. Then, in [26], DQN was used
to schedule the EV charging tasks based on the forecasted
electricity price information. Another category of RL is called
policy gradient, that has been applied in [27], [28]. Policy
gradient was employed for scheduling the consumption of
appliances in [27]. The similar method was used for managing
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system in
the household [28]; the thermal comfort can be predicted
by a Bayesian network while controlling the HVAC system.
However, for both DQN and policy gradient, the action space
still needs to be discretized. Also, with more appliances and
households, the scalability of the model-free methods becomes
an issue.
In this paper, we propose a distributed learning-based
framework for jointly scheduling energy consumption and
preserving privacy for the households. Specifically, the elec-
tricity price is influenced by the total consumption of the
households, and therefore the households should work together
to reduce the electricity cost. The non-cooperative stochastic
game is then utilized to model the interactions between the
households and the power grid with the electricity price as
an uncertainty factor to all households. To search for the
NE for the game, a model-free method is adopted, which is
different from [8], [10], [11], [13]–[15] that require the price
information and consumption ahead of time. To further address
the discretization issue associated with Q-learning [18]–[23],
DQN [24]–[26], and policy gradient [27], [28], the employed
model-free approach is similar to model-based methods that
provide a continuous value as the solution without discretizing
the action space. Also, with more appliances and households,
the scalability of the model-free methods is an important
issue, which is a largely unexplored problem. To address
this issue, a distributed framework is designed to utilize the
model-free method, which is motivated by [12]–[15]. When
training the parameters of the distributed model-free method,
the households may need to exchange their information with
each other which is similar as [12]. For privacy concerns, some
households are not interested in revealing their consumption
profiles to others. We therefore introduce a trusted third party
is introduced to the proposed framework, such that the privacy
of the households can be preserved.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
• The interaction between the power grid and the house-
holds is modeled in the form of a stochastic game where
the electricity price is the stochastic variable. Then, we
devise a novel model-free approach to search for the NE
for the game.
• We propose a new deep RL approach, which does not
require discretization, for scheduling consumption of the
appliances in the households. Also, the privacy of the
households is taken into account when utilizing the
proposed RL method.
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed method
with a real-world dataset. The results indicate the pro-
posed model-free method can result in a saving of about
12% in PAR and 11% in load variance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin
by introducing the system model in Section II. Then, the
interactions of the households and the aggregator is formulated
as a non-cooperative stochastic game in Section III. The way
of utilizing reinforcement learning to search for the NE is
explained in Section IV. Next, utilizing the real-world dataset
to evaluate the proposed method as well as the results of
the evaluation are provided in Section V. Section VI gives
conclusions and suggestions for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Model
We consider a power grid with a utility company (i.e.,
distributed system operator (DSO)), which provides power
to a set N = {1, 2, · · · , N} of N households as shown in
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Fig. 1. System model used in this paper.
Fig. 1. Each household is equipped with an energy consump-
tion controller (ECC), which is responsible to schedule the
consumption of the appliances in the household. ECCs are
responsible to schedule the consumption of appliances in a
set of equal-length time slots T = {1, 2, . . . , T}.
Let Ai = {1, 2, · · · , Ai} denote set of the appliances in
household i. In each time slot, an appliance is either awake
or asleep. The appliance is awake when it needs to consume
power, and the appliance is regarded as asleep when ECC
fulfills its consumption. If the appliance is awake, it has a
state denoted by a tuple as si,j,t = {t, Ei,j,t}, where t and
Ei,j,t represent the current time and required consumption,
respectively. By contrast, the state for the asleep appliance is
represented as si,j,t = {t, 0}.
Normally, these appliances can be separated into two cate-
gories, which are shiftable and non-shiftable (must-run) appli-
ances. If an appliance is regarded as the non-shiftable appli-
ance, then the ECC should supply its consumption without any
delay when it is awake. The ECC can delay the consumption
of the shiftable appliances. Shiftable appliances can further
be defined into interruptible and non-interruptible appliances.
For a non-interruptible appliance (e.g., dishwasher or washing
machine), the power supply cannot be interrupted once the
ECC turns it on. However, the power supply can be interrupted
for an interruptible appliance (e.g., electric vehicle (EV)). With
these categories, we can assign Ai = {NSAi, NIAi, IAi},
where MSAi, NIAi, IAi denote the set of non-shiftable, non-
interruptible, and interruptible appliances in the i-th house-
hold, respectively. Since the consumption of non-shiftable
appliances cannot be modified, the objective of the i-th ECC
is then to consume an amount of power, Pi,t, to support the
power for appliance j ∈ {NIAi, IAi}, in every time slot.
For the privacy reason, the households do not reveal their
power consumption information to the DSO. There is an
aggregator belonging to a trusted third party to communicate
with the DSO for the households. Therefore, the ECC has
limited capability of observing the state of other households
in the power grid; that is, the observation of the ECC is limited
to its own household.
B. Pricing Model
The ECC acts as the consumption scheduler for the house-
hold. The objective of the consumption scheduling is to
minimize the electricity cost. In time slot t, the generation
cost is used to describe the trend of the electricity price, and
therefore the price can be defined as
λt = α1L
2
t + α2Lt + α3, (1)
where α1, α2, and α3 are the generation coefficients. Then,
Lt is the total load in the grid and it is represented as
Lt =
∑
i∈N
Pi,t +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈NSAi
Ei,j,t. (2)
Besides, the results in [10] verified that the real-time pricing
(RTP) can be implemented in the form of combining the
inclining block rate (ICB) mechanism and (1). Thus, the RTP
model used in this paper can be expressed as
RTPt =
 λt, 0 ≤ Lt ≤ δ1,σ1λt δ1 ≤ Lt ≤ δ2,
σ2λt Lt > δ2,
(3)
where RTPt is the real-time price at time t. δ1 and δ2
indicate the specified net load thresholds. Then, σ1 and σ2
are the threshold pricing constants such that σ2 ≥ σ1 ≥ 1.
Since RTP is generated in real-time, the future electricity
price is unknown to the ECCs. The reason of adopting the
RTP mechanism is that it can help smooth the load profile.
That is, the electricity price is high if the consumption is
high, and therefore the households will be willing to reduce
the consumption. Therefore, the effectiveness of the RTP
mechanism can be reflected in the load profile.
III. CONSUMPTION SCHEDULING GAME
In order to minimize the electricity cost, each ECC needs
to schedule the consumption profile for the household. The
actions of the ECCs are based on the current electricity
price information. However, the electricity price is generated
according to the consumption profile of all households. The
electricity price is thus regarded as a stochastic variable for
all ECCs. With this setting, the interaction of the households
and the aggregator can be modeled as consumption scheduling
game.
A. Game Formulation and Nash Equilibrium
When the current electricity price is high, the ECCs shift
the consumption to the time slot with a lower electricity price
to reduce the electricity cost for the households. Also, when
shifting the consumption, the ECC does not consider how
other ECCs react to the high electricity price. However, the
aggregator does not want all ECCs to shift the consumption
to the same time slot. Therefore, the aggregator generates the
electricity price again to force ECCs to change their decisions.
That is, the ECCs may face high electricity price again in
the future if all ECCs decide to shift the consumption. At
the same time, the current electricity price will decrease. The
ECCs cannot obtain the future electricity price information,
and therefore all ECCs should work together to reduce the
electricity cost under uncertainty of the electricity prices. The
interaction among the households and the aggregator can then
be captured in the form of a non-cooperative stochastic game.
The main components of the game include:
4• Player: the ECCs in the set of households N and the
aggregator;
• State: the states of the appliances in the i-th household
si,t = {si,j,t|j ∈ Ai};
• Observation: electricity price and states at time t and t−1;
• Action: power consumption for shiftable appliances in
each household Pi,t; and
• Payoff function: expected accumulative reward.
At the beginning of time slot t ∈ T , the appliances in
the households update their states (i.e., whether an appli-
ance is awake or asleep, or it needs more power). The
ECCs submit the consumption to the aggregator, and then
the aggregator broadcasts the electricity price according to
(3). Based on the price information, the ECC of the i-th
household obtains the observation of the environment denoted
by oi,t = {RTPt−1, RTPt, si,t−1, si,t} ∈ Oi, where Oi is the
set of possible observations for household i. There exists an
action function in each ECC with parameter θµi for mapping
the observation to an action denoted by Pi,t = piθµi (oi,t). After
deciding Pi,t, each ECC receives the electricity price again,
and then the electricity cost can be represented as
r1i,t = RTPt × Pi,t. (4)
Other than the electricity cost, the ECC should be aware of a
constraint. That is, the total consumption of the appliances
should be the same before and after scheduling. Another
function, r2i,t, is then added to address this issue. The definition
of r2i,t is
r2i,t =
 0, t 6= T,1 t = T,Ei,j,t > 0
2 t = T,Ei,j,t = 0,
(5)
where 2 > 0 and 1 < 0. The reward function is then
denoted by ri,t = r2i,t − r1i,t. In each time slot, the ECC
aims to minimize the cost; minimizing the cost is the same as
maximizing −r1i,t. Then, at the end of the scheduling horizon,
the ECCs receive a positive value on r2i,t if all the required
consumption of the appliance is fulfilled. By contrast, r2i,t is
negative if the ECCs do not fulfill the requirement. Thus, the
ECCs turn to maximize the reward for the households. Then,
the ECC in the i-th household cares about the accumulative
reward over a time horizon. The accumulative reward of the
i-th household with discount factor γi at time k can be
formulated as
R(oi,k, piθµi (oi,k)) =
T∑
t=k
γt−ki ri,t, (6)
where Pi,k = piθi(oi,k). The discount factor can be used to
represent the users’ preference. That is, the users care about
the short-term reward if γ is close to 0. By contrast, the users
is foresighted if γ is close to 1. The expected accumulative
reward can then be extended from (6) as
Ji(piθµi ) = E
[
R(oi,1, Pi,1)
∣∣∣piθµi ] ,
=
∫
Oi
ρ
piµθi (oi,1)R
(
oi,1, piθµi (oi,1)
)
doi,t, (7)
= E
oi,t∼ρ
pi
µ
θi
[
R
(
oi,1, piθµi (oi,1)
)]
,
where ρ
piθµ
i is the distribution of the observation. In (7), the
ECC attempts to maximize the reward function over the time
horizon. For simplicity, we use Pi,t instead of piθi(oi,t) later.
After modeling the game, we discuss how each household
determines an action function, piθi(oi,t), in the consumption
scheduling game to maximize the expected accumulative re-
ward. In this context, the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is a
solution for the stochastic game, should be searched.
NE is a state of the game where no player can benefit by
unilaterally changing strategies, for given strategies of other
players. The NE of the consumption scheduling game, denoted
by {pi∗
θµ1
· · ·pi∗
θµN
}, which means the ECCs use the optimal
parameters for the action function. Then, for all households,
the NE has the following relation: To obtain the NE, the
following optimization problem should be solved
Ji
(
pi∗θµi |pi
∗
θµ−i
)
≥ Ji
(
piθµi |pi∗θµ−i
)
, (8)
where pi∗
θµ−i
is the action functions with optimal parameters in
the ECCs except the i-th ECC. The inequality implies that the
expected accumulative reward will be lower if the i-th ECC
does not use optimal parameters for the action function, pi∗
θµi
.
The proof of the existence of NE is provided in Appendix A.
To obtain the NE, we need to solve the following optimiza-
tion problem
max
θµi
Ji
(
piθµi |piθµ−i
)
(9)
In (9), the i-th household needs to know the action functions
of other households. However, the ECCs are not able to
observe the states of the appliances in other households.
Therefore, the action functions of other households cannot be
obtained. To address this issue, some model-based methods
attempt to model the actions of other households. However,
the performance depends on the accuracy of the models.
Compared to the model-based methods, model-free methods
can obtain good performance without modeling the actions of
other households. Hence, we attempt to introduce a model-free
method (i.e., policy gradient) to search for the NE.
IV. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED DEEP RL FRAMEWORK
The ECCs need to know the future electricity price to solve
(9). Also, the actions of other ECCs are required. Because
the ECCs cannot observe the actions of other households and
obtain the future electricity price, the expected accumulative
reward cannot be obtained directly. In this context, historical
data is utilized. That is, a model-free method (i.e., policy
gradient) is introduced to learn from the past experience.
Moreover, the proposed method should preserve the privacy
for the households. The detailed steps of the proposed method
are introduced in the following subsections.
5A. Deterministic Policy Gradient
In the consumption scheduling game, there is an actor
function mapping the observation to the action with parameter
θµi . In this paper, this function can be represented with a
DNN, denoted by actor network. To solve the optimization
problem, the gradient method can be utilized to update the
actor network parameter. However, the differentiation of the
objective function, Ji(piθµi ) in (7), cannot be computed directly,
because the reward in the future is unknown. Hence, the
gradient cannot be calculated. Moreover, at time t, the actions
before the current time are already specified by the ECC, and
therefore the accumulative reward is fixed. Therefore, a one-
step bootstrapping function is employed to approximate the
expected accumulative reward in the future
Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) = E
[
R (oi,t, Pi,t)
∣∣∣oi,t, Pi,t;piθµi ] , (10a)
= ri,t + γ
∫
Oi
pi,tR (oi,t+1, Pi,t+1) doi,t+1, (10b)
where Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) is called action value function and pi,t
is the state transition probability from time t to t + 1. The
action value function states that the value of R (oi,t, Pi,t) is
Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) given the current state and action. With the
action value function, we can now show how to upgrade θµi .
Suppose Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) and piθµi (oi,t) are continuous and
differentiable. Then, the policy gradient can be expressed as
∇θµi Ji(piθµi ) = ∇θµi
∫
Oi,t
Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t)ρ
piµθi doi,t, (11a)
=
∫
Oi
ρ
piµθi∇θµi piθµi (oi,t)∇Pi,tQθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) doi,t, (11b)
= E
oi,t∼ρ
pi
µ
θi
[
∇θµi piθµi (oi,t)∇Pi,tQθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t)
]
. (11c)
The derivation can be obtained in the similar way as policy
gradient in [29]. The method in (11) is denoted by deter-
ministic policy gradient (DPG), which is different from the
traditional policy gradient. The traditional policy gradient out-
puts a probability distribution function (PDF) over the action
space. However, the output of the consumption scheduling
game should only be a scalar. Thus, DPG [30] is employed,
which does not discretize the action space, in this paper.
In (11c), two terms should be determined, ∇θµi piθµi (oi,t)
and ∇Pi,tQθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t). The former term is easy because the
relation between the actor network and the variables is already
clear. However, getting the derivation of the latter term is
challenging because there exists an integration in (10). Thus,
another method is required to address this issue.
B. Actor-Critic Method
Deriving Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) is challenging because it contains
an integration and the future reward is unknown. Therefore,
a differentiable action value function is substituted in place
of Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t). Normally, there are two alternatives for the
substitute in the literature, namely online and offline meth-
ods. The online method is State–action–reward–state–action
(SARSA) and the offline method is Q-learning as introduced
in [31]. In this paper, we choose to use the offline method
Critic Network
Actor Network
Target Critic Network
Target Actor Network Target Network
Main Network
Fig. 2. Actor-critic architecture.
because ECC may record the data locally to train the replaced
action value function. Moreover, similar to DQN, DNN can
be utilized to represent the Q-table in Q-learning. Thus, the
action value function can be expressed as
Qθ
µ
i (oi,t, Pi,t) ≈ Qθ
Q
i (oi,t, Pi,t) = piθQi
(oi,t, Pi,t), (12)
where Qθ
Q
i (oi,t, Pi,t) is called a critic, and it is generated by
a critic network, piθQi (oi,t, Pi,t), with the parameter, θ
Q
i . The
objective function of the critic network is
min
θQi
E
[
Qθ
Q
i (oi,t, Pi,t)− yi
]2
(13)
yi is the target action value function, and it is generated by
yi = ri,t + γQˆ
θQi (oi,t+1, Pˆi,t+1), (14)
where Qˆθ
Q
i (oi,t+1, Pˆi,t+1) is the target action value for time
t + 1. Then, Pˆi,t+1 is obtained by another actor network
denoted by target actor network, which is motivated by [24].
The architecture of the actor-critic method is provided in Fig.2.
In order to minimize (13), the observation and the action at
the current time slot are not enough because this can introduce
bias in the critic network. More specifically, the observations
at the current time are highly correlated to the observations
of previous time slots. Thus, the training may be unstable.
To overcome this situation, a replay buffer Di, which stores
historical data for the i-th ECC, is introduced. Then, a subset
in Di is used to train the critic network, and the number of data
in this subset is called batch size, M . With the critic network,
the actor network can be trained. Also, the critic network can
be updated by using the gradient of (13).
C. Centralized Critic Distributed Action
Each ECC can have an actor network and a critic network
based on the framework in Fig. 2. However, with a local critic
network in the ECC, the parameters of the actor network can
be trapped around the local optimum due to the lack of the
observations from other households. To address this problem,
we attempt to generate the critic with the observation of all
households. In this context, the aggregator has the global
6Households
Aggregator
Actor Network
Parameter:      
Target Actor Network
Parameter:
Target Critic Network
Parameter:
Critic Network
Parameter:      
Replay Buffer
Observation
Fig. 3. The architecture of centralized critic distributed action.
view of the system, and therefore it can generate the critic
for each household. That is, the critic network is moved to
the aggregator. The critic generated by the aggregator can be
expressed as
Qθ
Q
i = piθQi
(o1,t, · · · , oN,t, P1,t, · · · , PN,t), (15)
where the inputs contain the observations and actions of all
households. In this context, the aggregator is responsible to
generate a centralized critic, and then each ECC can still
obtain a distributed action. With this method, the households
do not need to exchange θµi and Pi,t with each other. Thus,
the privacy of the households can be preserved.
To implement the centralized critic distributed action, a
similar framework as in Fig. 2 is employed. That is, two target
networks are added, target actor and target critic networks, and
they have the same parameters and architecture as actor and
critic networks. The target networks, however, depend on the
same parameters we attempt to train. Hence, this makes the
training procedure unstable. To overcome this situation, the set
of parameters is given close to the current parameters but with
a time delay. That is, different from the method in [24], which
uses the parameters of current actor and critic networks, the
parameters of target networks are updated every β (β > 1)
time slots. Then, the parameters of target networks can be
updated as
θˆµi ← τθµi + (1− τ)θˆµi , θˆQi ← τθQi + (1− τ)θˆQi , (16)
where θˆµi and θˆ
Q
i are the parameters of the target actor and
target critic networks, respectively. The relation of all networks
is presented in Fig. 3.
D. Offline Training Online Testing Algorithm
Based on the techniques introduced from Section IV-A to
IV-C and Fig. 3, we now summarize the algorithm for training
the networks such that the NE of consumption scheduling
game can be obtained. The parameters are trained offline; by
doing so, the data in the replay buffer can be used to provide
more knowledge to the networks. In the training phase, the
data from t = 1 to t = T is called an episode. The training
stops when the maximum number of specified episodes is
reached. After the training phase, the trained networks can
schedule the consumption of the appliances in real-time.
Before starting the training procedure, the parameters of the
networks are initialized randomly. An additional parameter,
l, is initialized to 0. Then, the training of the networks is
performed by the households interacting with the aggregator.
At the beginning of each time slot, the ECCs first obtain
the states of the appliance. The ECC submits the states to
the aggregator, and then receives the electricity price. By
combining the states and the electricity price, the observation
can be obtained. The observation is provided as an input to the
actor network, and then Pi,t is generated. During the training,
the state space should be explored so that the actor network
will not converge to the local optimum. Thus, a random noise
is added to the output of the actor network for exploration as
Pi,t = piθµi (oi,t) +N , (17)
where N is the exploration noise. The ECC will decide
to draw the power from the grid with the amount of
Pi,t +
∑
j∈NSAi Ei,j,t. With the power, the ECC will allo-
cate the power according to the order of non-shiftable, non-
interruptible and interruptible appliances. At the same time,
the reward can be obtained through (4) and (5), and then we
store (oi,t, Pi,t, ri,t, oi,t+1) to the replay buffer. At each time
slot, l is increased by 1.
The parameters of the networks are updated when l reaches
β. First, M samples from the replay buffer are taken out. With
these samples, Pˆi,t+1 is generated for the target critic network.
Based on the generated Pˆi,t+1, the target critic network will
generate yi for the critic network. The critic network can then
be updated by minimizing (13). The critic in the aggregator can
broadcast Qθ
Q
i to all households based on the updated network.
The action networks of the households can then be updated by
using the M samples and (11). The parameters of the target
actor and the target critic networks are also updated by (16).
After updating the networks, l is set to 0 again. The training
procedure operates iteratively until the maximum number of
specified episodes, Mep, is reached. Then, the trained networks
can be applied to perform real-time consumption scheduling.
The algorithm is denoted by distributed power consumption
scheduling (DPCS), which is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The
convergence of DPCS to NE and the uniqueness of NE can be
obtained by starting from the Bellman equation and Bellman
error of RL methods as in [32]–[35].
E. Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of DPCS is now analyzed
and compared with the computational complexity of central-
ized critic centralized action and the computational complexity
of the traditional model-based method (e.g., [36]). Specifically,
the authors in [36] design an energy management strategy by
utilizing a sample weighted average approximation method to
search for the NE of the formulated stochastic game.
Centralized critic centralized action means that there is
only one main and one target network; an actor network
is responsible for generating the actions for all households.
Since DPCS also uses centralized critic, the difference is
7Algorithm 1: Distributed Power Consumption Scheduling
(DPCS)
1 Initialize actor and critic networks with random weights
θµi and θ
Q
i
2 The weight of target actor and target critic networks are
assigned as θˆµi ← θµi and θˆQi ← θQi
3 Initialize the replay buffer Di for each ECC and set l = 0
4 for episode = 1 to Mep do
5 Obtain the observation oi,t for all households
6 for t = 1 to T do
7 Obtain Pi,t for all i
8 Execute Pi,t and obtain oi,t+1 for all i
9 Store (si,t, Pi,t, ri,t, si,t+1) to Di
10 Allocate the power to the appliances
11 l = l + 1
12 if l == β then
13 Every ECC samples M data from Di to
aggregator
14 for ECC = i to N do
15 Calculate the yi based on (14) and (15)
16 Update the critic by minimizing 13
17 Update the actor network by (11);
18 Update the parameters of target networks (16)
19 l = 0
20 UsePi,t=piθµi(oi,t) for real-time consumption scheduling
in the actor network. Also, the computational complexity
of the model-free methods is equally huge in the training
phase. Therefore, the computational complexity of DPCS is
compared with centralized critic centralized action for the real-
time control. The computation of DNN without considering
activation functions can be viewed as matrix multiplication.
Then, the computational complexity of DNN can be approxi-
mately expressed as O(MKV ), where M , K, and V are the
number of input nodes, number of hidden layers, and number
of output nodes. The complexity of the centralized action is
O(N |oi,t|KN), where |oi,t| is the cardinality of oi,t; however,
it is O(|oi,t|K) for DPCS. When the number of households is
huge, DPCS can obtain much lower computational complexity
than the centralized critic centralized action.
The computational complexity of [36] is O(n3Nb) accord-
ing to [37], where n is the dimension of the variable and b
is the required number of iteration. That is, the computational
complexity of solving the quadratic optimization problem for
each household is O(n3), and then there is a total of N
households and needs b rounds of iteration. On the other hand,
the computational complexity of DPCS is O(MMep|oi,t|K)
in the training phase. Thus, the complexity is dominated
by the batch size, M , and the number of episodes, Mep.
Usually, the product of M and Mep is much larger than n3.
However, the computational complexity becomes O(|oi,t|K)
when the ECCs perform the real-time control. In this case,
using the ECCs to perform the real-time control can obtain
less computational complexity than [36].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the proposed method is evaluated on a large
real-world database recorded by Pecan Street Inc. [38]. Pecan
Street Inc. provides a real-world testbed, which includes the
data of energy consumption profile with more than 1, 000
households in Texas, USA. Three scenarios are considered,
where one utility company serves 4, 10, and 50 households
in the system, respectively. There is a total of 10 types of the
appliances described in Table I, and the household may not
have all appliances. The data from 05/01/2017 to 10/31/2018
is used to train the ECCs, and then the consumption profile on
11/05/2018 is used to evaluate the training results. The α1,
α2, and α3 are set to 0.02, 0.02, and 0.5, respectively. For the
ICB, σ1 is set to 1.1 and σ2 is 1.3. Then, δ1 and δ2 are set to
50 kW and 100 kW, respectively. 1 is set to the product of
−60 and unfulfilled demand, and 2 is 50.
Before training the networks, the data from Pecan Street Inc.
should be preprocessed. In the dataset, some households may
have more than one specific appliance (e.g., a household may
have two or more refrigerators), but some households are not.
We then sum up the consumption profile of these appliances
as one appliance. Also, the data of some households under a
certain duration is missing. The missing value is synthesized
with data of previous days.
The parameters used for training the networks are as follow.
For the DPCS, the actor and critic networks are composed of
DNN with 2 hidden layers, and each layer has 64 neurons. The
batch size is set to 500. The Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is
used as the activation function, and the batch normalization
is applied in each layer. Adam is adopted for gradient-based
optimization and the learning rate is 0.001. The size of the
replay buffer D is 106. γi is set to 0.99 and τ is set to 0.1. The
maximum episode is set to 1000 and each episode contains 36
hours. Then, 36 hours are separated to 144 time slots, which
means each time slot is 15 minutes. The parameters of the
networks are updated every 10 episodes (i.e., β = 1440).
To compare the load profile after scheduling the appliances,
the PAR metric is utilized, which can be defined as
PAR = log
(
Lk
1
T
∑T
t=1 Lt
)
, (18)
where k = {t| argmaxLt}. Then, we compare the electricity
cost as
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
RTPt × Pi,t. (19)
The proposed method is compared with two types of deep
deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) [39], which is a popular
RL method that can outperform the traditional RL methods
(e.g., Q-leaning) and it is also used in [28]. The first one is
a centralized DDPG framework, denoted by C-DDPG. That
is, the C-DDPG has the all observation of the households
and it is responsible for scheduling the consumption of all
households. Another is a distributed framework of DDPG,
referred to as D-DDPG. In D-DDPG, every household has
a DDPG network that schedules the consumption of the
appliances without considering the actions of other appliances.
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Fig. 4. Load profile of 4 appliances.
Then, C-DDPG and D-DDPG use the same parameters as
DPCS. The method from [36] is the sample weighted average
approximation that is referred to as SWAA. DPCS is also
compared with SWAA in the simulation. The simulations for
computation time were conducted with Python 3.7.7 running
on Intel i5-8500B computer with 3.0 GHz CPU and 16 GB
RAM.
A. Learning Capabilities
Before assessing the load profile, the training results are
provided. In this part, we only show the results of 4 households
for ease of explaining. The scenario with 10 and 50 households
has the same trend and performance. First, the load curve
is shown in Fig. 4. Before 12 : 00, the shiftable appliances
consume a similar amount as the non-shiftable appliances.
After 12 : 00, the consumption of non-shiftable appliance
increases drastically, and the load profile of the shiftable
appliances remain stable.
After analyzing the load curve, the reward curves versus
the number of episodes of three algorithms are shown in Fig.
5. The average reward in Fig. 5 represents the trend of the
reward during the training phase. We can observe from Fig. 5
that the average reward is very low at the beginning since
the actor networks are initialized with random parameters.
Three algorithms update the policies during the training phase.
For C-DDPG and DPCS, the reward during each episode
improves and finally converges to the similar point. Then,
C-DDPG has all the information of the households and it
does not need the help from the aggregator such that it can
converge more quickly than DPCS. In this case, it is proved
that the proposed method can converge to the same point as the
centralized framework. However, for the D-DDPG, the ECCs
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Fig. 6. The individual reward of the households during the training phase.
cannot obtain any information from other households such that
the ECCs cannot develop good critic network. Thus, the actor
network cannot choose good action, such that the reward keeps
decreasing.
We now take a closer look at the reward of each household.
The reward curves of each household by applying DPCS are
shown in Fig. 6. The objective of DPCS is to maximize the
reward function. For the 3-rd and the 4-th household, they
obtain poor performance at the beginning of the training; by
contrast, household 1 and 2 show decent performance from the
beginning. Therefore, during the training phase, households
1 and 2 must remain the same performance. On the other
hand, the reward of the 3-rd and the 4-th household need
to be improved. According to Fig. 6, the proposed method
can actually guide the household, which does not have good
performance at the beginning, to eventually receive higher
reward.
Finally, the reward between DPCS and D-DDPG is com-
pared in Table II. At the beginning of the training, the ECCs
may have very low reward for both DPCS and D-DDPG. The
ECCs can get higher reward after training with the DPCS
for 1000 episodes. However, the performance of the ECCs
degrades after the training procedure. This is because the
update of action function needs to know the policies of other
ECCs. If the policies of other ECCs cannot be obtained, it can
make the actor network trapped in the local optimum or just
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REWARD COMPARISON
Method DPCS D-DDPG
Episode 1 1000 1 1000
1-st house −221.67 103.55 −1969.35 −1816.22
2-nd house −1426.35 −308.32 34.39 −2189.60
3-rd house −533.37 163.32 147.67 −244.11
4-th house −281.43 127.65 −485.75 −275.00
TABLE III
LOAD PROFILE WITH AND WITHOUT SCHEDULING OF DPCS
Original With scheduling
4 Households
peak (kW) 8.9874 8.3517
mean (kW) 5.8644 5.7171
Var 2.4648 2.1378
PAR 0.4269 0.3790
Cost (dime) 205.9080 193.3008
10 Households
peak (kW) 19.5222 18.4471
mean (kW) 12.9803 12.9093
Var 10.1750 9.3615
PAR 0.4081 0.3570
Cost (dime) 1483.0473 1369.6979
50 Households
peak (kW) 97.6112 92.4692
mean (kW) 64.9013 64.6250
Var 254.3740 226.7057
PAR 0.4081 0.3597
Cost (dime) 15813.3927 15053.4893
update randomly.
B. Load Profile
To test whether good training results can actually result in
promising outcomes for the households, the proposed methods
is investigated with the load profile. We use the trained
network to schedule consumption on 11/05/2018 and then
compare the load profile. The comparing indices are peak load,
mean load, variance of the load, PAR, and total electricity cost.
The comparison is provided in Table IV and III.
For the scenario of 4 households, there is 7.07% reduction
on peak load, 11.22% reduction on PAR, and 13.26% on
load variance. For 10 households, the reduction on peak load,
PAR, and load variance are 5.52%, 12.52% and the 8.00%,
respectively. There is 5.27% reduction on peak load, 12.20%
reduction on PAR, and 10.87% reduction on load variance
for 50 households. According to the simulation results, the
proposed method will result in a significant reduction on PAR
and lead to a lower variation of the load profile. With this
approach, it will lead to improvement of the stability of the
power grid. At the same time, the electricity cost for the
households can be reduced.
The proposed method can efficiently schedule the power
consumption for the households. However, we do not know the
performance of the proposed method compared to C-DDPG
even both algorithms can converge to the same point in terms
of the average reward. Also, DPCS should be compared with
the model-based approach that is SWAA. Thus, the compari-
son of C-DDPG, DPCS, and SWAA is provided in Table IV. In
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS FOR 4
HOUSEHOLDS
C-DDPG DPCS SWAA
peak (kW) 8.2626 8.3517 8.2367
mean (kW) 5.7275 5.7171 5.7144
Var 2.2880 2.1378 2.0034
PAR 0.3665 0.3790 0.3611
Cost (dime) 193.2410 193.3008 193.1001
Computation time for
real-time control (s) 1.58 1.53 120.58
Table IV, the computation time is calculated based on the real-
time operation in one time slot (15 mins). According to the
results, three algorithms can obtain similar load statistic; it can
ensure that DPCS can have the same performance as C-DDPG
and SWAA. However, the load variance in SWAA is less than
in DPCS. This is because SWAA has the information of load
profile and the corresponding electricity price for the whole
day. Therefore, it can schedule the load with less variation. For
DPCS, the load profiles of the households undergo quite a bit
of fluctuations in the morning as shown in Fig.7. Nonetheless,
the performance in terms of the total electricity cost, all three
algorithms result in similar values. On the other hand, DPCS
and C-DDPG obtain lower computation time than SWAA
which validates our analysis in Section IV-E. Moreover, the
proposed method can preserve the privacy for the households;
this is not the case with C-DDPG and SWAA.
In Table III and IV, one can notice that the reduction of
the electricity cost may not be so significant. This is because
of the electricity price and the corresponding load curve. The
electricity price is generated from (3), which is a quadratic
form and highly dependent on the load value. Then, non-
shiftable appliances consume a huge amount of energy in
the evening such that the price in the evening will thus be
originally high. To reduce the cost, the consumption of some
shiftable appliances is shifted to the midnight; however, this
may increase the electricity price around midnight. Therefore,
the reduction of the electricity cost is mainly on how to shift
the consumption of the shiftable appliances in the evening.
Then, in order to virtualize the statistic mentioned above, the
load profiles of 4 households before and after scheduling are
presented in Fig. 7.
We then observe the outcome in Fig. 7. In the morning,
there may exist peak load for some households (e.g., 8:00 for
households 1 and 2, or 10:00 for household 3). However, this
may not cause peak load for the power grid, and therefore
the households obtain similar consumption pattern before and
after scheduling. Then, the peak load of the power grid occurs
around 20:00 such that the ECCs need to carefully schedule
the consumption. In this context, ECCs 3 and 4 decide to
decrease the consumption to reduce peak load for the power
grid; ECCs 1 and 2 remain the same load profile. This is
because households 3 and 4 use most of the power for charging
EVs, and therefore this portion can be delayed to the midnight.
By doing so, the situation can be avoided where all ECCs
decrease the consumption load together when the peak load
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Fig. 7. The load profile of each household. (a) Household 1. (b) Household
2. (c) Household 3. (d) Household 4.
occurs; the peak load may be shifted to another time slot.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel model-free framework was proposed
for scheduling the consumption profile of the appliances in the
households. The interactions between the households and the
aggregator was modeled as a non-cooperative stochastic game.
Then, we applied a model-free method (i.e., policy gradient) to
search for the Nash equilibrium (NE). However, the traditional
policy gradient suffers from the discretization issue. A method
based on deterministic policy gradient (DPG) was then pre-
sented to address this issue. Moreover, the proposed method
can preserve the privacy for the households and address the
scalability issue. For verifying the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method, real-world data were employed to evaluate the
performance of the proposed method under different number
of households in the power grid. The results revealed that the
aggregator introduced in the proposed framework can help the
search of the NE for each ECC without the communication
between households. The proposed method was then able
to reduce the electricity cost for the households, while also
reducing 12% on the PAR for the power grid. Moreover,
the proposed method can achieve the similar performance as
the traditional model-free method and obtain faster real-time
control compared to the model-based method.
For future research, we will incorporate the satisfaction level
of the households in the proposed method. That is, the deadline
and the comfort level (temperature and humidity) of shifting
the consumption should be incorporated. In addition, it would
be interesting to incorporate the feedback of the households
to the training procedure. In this case, a more customized
scheduling policy can be provided for the household.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of the Existence of NE
The following theorem should be proved to ensure the
existence of NE of the stochastic game.
Theorem 1. Consider a stochastic game with continuous ac-
tion and observation spaces. If action spaces and observation
spaces are compact, payoff functions are continuous, then at
least one Nash equilibrium exists.
The definition of compact is provided as follow.
Definition 1. A subset of Rn is compact if the set is closed
and bounded.
First, the observation space of household i, Oi, and the
action space of ECC i, Ai, are limited to [0,∞), and therefore
they are compact. Also, the payoff function is continuous.
Then, we define a function fi : Ai → Ai as fi(θµi ) = θµ
′
i
such that ECC i can obtain higher payoff from θµ
′
i than from
θµi . Moreover, ECC i can get a benefit of
φi = max
{
0, Ji
(
pi
θµ
′
i
|piθµ−i
)
− Ji
(
piθµi |piθµ−i
)}
, (20)
by changing θµi to θ
µ′
i . Then, Corollary 1, whose proof can
be found in [40], ensures that fi has at least one fixed point.
Corollary 1. (Brouwer’s fixed point theorem) Let K =
∏
∆m,
where ∆m is a simplex, be a simplotope and let fi : K → K
be continuous. Then, fi has a fixed point.
Next, we need to show that the fixed points of fi are Nash
equilibria. If θµi is a NE, and then φi = 0,∀i, making θµi
a fixed point of fi. Conversely, consider θ
µ
i as an arbitrary
fixed point of fi. Then, assume that there exists a point, θ
µ′
i ,
that causes Ji
(
pi
θµ
′
i
|piθµ−i
)
≥ Ji
(
piθµi |piθµ−i
)
. However, θµi
is a fixed point of fi; which means φi = 0,∀i. From the
definition of φi, this can only happen if no player can improve
its expected payoff by changing θµi . Thus, θ
µ
i is a NE, and θ
µ
i
is equal to θµ
′
i .
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